An Undercutting assault as described on this paper, is a mining technique which entails producing new blocks not on the longest identified chain, however as an alternative ‘undercutting’ the longest chain by constructing a block, which collects much less of the accessible transactions’ charges, on a shorter chain. This conduct creates a direct incentive for one more miner to now construct new blocks on the ‘undercutting’ chain as there exist the next sum of transactions’ charges for them to gather.
Within the paper, the authors describe how this will result in a state of affairs by which a 51% assault might be efficiently carried out with lower than 51% of the hashing energy of the community. That is enabled as a result of undercutters orphaning blocks and reducing the efficient hashing energy of the community (the 51% attackers have a bonus as they needn’t orphan their very own blocks, however the sincere or undercutting miners work at a cumulatively decrease hash fee as a result of potential orphaning of upper worth blocks).
Are there any options which disincentivize Undercutting conduct? Or, can the conduct be mitigated by means of a change to the protocol?